ABSTRACT. The overall goal of our paper is to better understand water management reform in China's rural communities, especially focusing on the effect that improving incentives to water managers will have on the nation's water resources and the welfare of the rural population. To pursue this goal, the paper has three objectives. First, we track the evolution of water management reform and seek to identify the incentive mechanisms that encourage water managers to more efficiently use water. Second, we identify the impact on crop water use of the incentives provided to water managers during reform. Since we are also interested in the possible negative consequences of an incentive-led water management reform strategy, the paper also explores how changes in incentives also affect agricultural production, farmer income, and poverty.
results show that in our sample areas the two main forms of water management reform, Water User Associations and contracting, have begun to systematically replace traditional forms of collective management. Our analysis demonstrates, however, that it is not the nominal implementation of the reform that matters, but rather it is the creation of new management institutions that offer water managers monetary incentives that lead to water savings. Importantly, given China's concerns about national food production and poverty alleviation, the reductions in water, at least in our sample sites, do not lead to reductions in either production or income, and do not increase the incidence of poverty.
China's government has identified the nation's rising water scarcity as one of the key problems that must be solved if the nation is to meet its national development plan in the coming years (Zhang, 2001) . Shortages of water are attenuating efforts to alleviate poverty and are becoming a major source of environmental problems (World Bank, 1998; Zhang, 2000) . In many regions of the country, rapidly growing industry and an expanding, increasingly wealthy urban population regularly outcompete the nation's farmers for limited water resources, threatening to curtail growth in food production.
In facing increasing water shortages, leaders typically debate about which of several approaches they should use to address water scarcity problems, although no option has been proved very successful (Lohmar et al., 2003) . Developing more water resources to increase water supply historically has been given the highest priority in resolving water shortages. Since the 1950s, China's government has invested more than 100 billion US dollars into constructing infrastructure for developing new water resources (Wang, 2000) . Recently, the State Council announced plans to allocate more than 50 billion US dollars for the construction of a project to move water from the Yangtse River Valley to north China. Despite such ambitious goals, the high cost of developing new sources of water will mean that the volume of water that can be added to north China's water equation will still be marginal. Leaders also have promoted water-saving technologies and considered whether or not they should use a water pricing policy (Chen, 2002; Rosegrant and Cai, 2002) . Unfortunately, most of their efforts to encourage the use of sophisticated water-saving technologies, such as drip and sprinkler irrigation, have failed, and in the past several years the Ministry of Water Resources has distanced itself from a water policy based on water-saving technology (Zai, 2002) . Moreover, political considerations will most likely keep leaders from moving too aggressively on raising prices, at least in the agricultural sector (Rosegrant and Cai, 2002) .
With the failure and infeasibility of several of their policy options, leaders in recent years have begun to consider water management reform as a key part of their strategy to combat China's water problems, since they believe water in agriculture is being used inefficiently. Despite water shortages, users in all sectors of the economy -but especially those in agriculture, by far the nation's largest consumer of water -do not efficiently use the water they are allocated. One study, for example, estimated that, due to the poor management of the nation's canal network, only 50 per cent of water from primary canals is actually delivered to the field (Xu, 2001) . Also water that reaches village fields is not used efficiently by local irrigation managers and farmers, between 20 and 30 per cent of the water being wasted. Hence, overall, only about 40 per cent of water in China's surface water system, allocated to agricultural production, is actually used by farmers on their crops. Others have estimated even greater inefficiencies (Fang, 2000) . In response, it has been proposed that local leaders reform the institutions that manage water in China's communities (Nian, 2001; Reidinger, 2002) .
Despite the resolve of the current leadership in China to push through water management reform, there is considerable debate about its appropriateness. International evidence shows that water management and its institutional arrangements are important measures for dealing with water shortages (World Bank, 1993; IWMI and FAO, 1995) . Since the 1980s, many developing countries have begun to transfer irrigation management responsibilities from the government to farmer organizations or other private entities in order to mitigate the financial burden of water projects and to improve the efficiency of water use (Vermillion, 1997) . Theoretically, local water management reform is supposed to rely on increased participation by farmers and better incentives for managers to improve access to water and increase the efficiency of the system. Unfortunately, the records of a number of attempts to implement local water management reforms have not lived up to expectations; there are many cases internationally of efforts that have failed or have generated negative influences (Easter and Hearne, 1993; Vermillion, 1997; Groenfeldt and Svendsen, 2000) . Collective action, information problems, and failure to get the incentives right may be among the most important reasons why water management reforms have failed.
In fact, since the late 1990s China's policy makers have promoted water management reform, and, similar to attempts outside China, the record seems to be mixed, although most evaluations are only based on anecdotes or case studies (Nian, 2001; Huang, 2001; China Irrigation Association, 2002) . Even in those areas where management reform has been welldesigned, effective implementation of the reform has been difficult (Ma, 2001; Management Authority of Shaoshan Irrigation District, 2002) . Visits to the field can easily uncover cases where local water management changes were implemented and failed.
Although there are many similarities between international experiences and those of China, even in this early phase of reform the nation's water management reform strategy has taken on some unique characteristics. Above all, water officials have emphasized the role of incentives in water management reform. In many of the new reform efforts, water managers are provided with monetary rewards if they can meet certain targets, such as achieving water savings. Much less effort has been placed in encouraging participation by farmers in the management of the local irrigation system.
While the prominence given to incentives may be unique internationally (especially in the case of water management reform in developing countries), it is not new in the context of China's overall economic reform effort. Reformers have relied frequently on incentives to induce agents to exert more effort, allocate resources more efficiently and enter into new economic activities (Naughton, 1995) . The household responsibility system primarily gave incentives to farmers in crop production (Lin, 1992) . The fiscal reforms gave local leaders incentives to start up township and village enterprises (Walder, 1995) . The grain reforms gave grain bureau personnel the incentive to commercialize commodity trading (Rozelle et al., 2000) . Clearly, high-level water officials are hoping a similar set of reforms can improve the performance of China's water management.
While such a strategy also may encourage water managers to improve the efficiency of irrigation systems, in the case of water management there are a number of other issues that potentially may create a number of negative externalities. Since the reforms provide financial incentives to the manager to more efficiently manage water, it is possible that the manager could take a number of actions that could negatively affect production, income, and the poverty status of certain individuals. For example, managers could deliver less water than demanded by farmers or cut off water deliveries to slow-paying, poorer households. Surprisingly, despite the high stakes of the reforms, there has been little or no empirical-based work conducted to help understand and judge the effectiveness of water management reform.
The overall goal of our paper is to better understand the role of incentives in water management reform. We study how incentives have been used in irrigated villages in China's Yellow River Basin and focus on the effect that they will have on the nation's water resources, agricultural production, and rural incomes. To pursue this goal, the paper has three objectives. First, we track the evolution of water management reform and seek to identify the incentives mechanisms that encourage water managers to use water more efficiently. Second, we identify the impact on crop water use of the incentives provided to water managers during reform. Third, since we are also interested in the possible negative consequences of an incentive-led water management reform strategy, the paper explores how changes in incentives affect agricultural production, farmer income, and poverty.
Data
The data for our study come from a survey that we conducted in 51 villages in four irrigation districts (IDs) in Ningxia and Henan provinces. To increase the variation among regions, we chose provinces located in the upper (Ningxia) and lower reaches (Henan) of the Yellow River Basin (YRB).
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In selecting the irrigation districts for our study, we considered a number of criteria. From a number of IDs in each province, we chose two IDs, selecting one that is upstream in the province and one that is downstream. Choosing villages in the upstream and downstream part of the ID means that our sample includes some villages in regions where water is available in relative abundance, while others are in regions where water is relatively scarce. After the IDs were selected, we randomly chose sample villages from a census of villages in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of the canals within the IDs.
2 Enumerators also randomly chose four households within each village. After getting the basic information about each of the household's plot (including information about the number of irrigations per plot, each plot's soil type, the distance to the farmer's home, and whether or not the plot was hit by a disaster), the enumerators chose two plots from each household for more careful investigation. 3 In total we surveyed 51 villages leaders, 56 water managers, 189 farm households, and gathered information on 378 plots. 4 While located in different parts of China, the physical structure of the canal systems in each ID and their organization are similar. Each ID has a set of main canals that take their water directly out of the Yellow River. Officials from the ID, depending on their allocations from the Yellow River Basin Commission, make up a water allocation plan for each village. In most of our IDs, there is a metered gate that supplies water to each village. This makes each village a more or less independent agent of the ID. Such villages are typical of villages in North China next to the Yellow River. The canal network in the village, then, is completely maintained by the village and all of the water that flows into the village is for the exclusive use of the village's own residents (and does not have to be shared with villages either up or down stream of it). In each village, there is always a person -whether leader or appointed water manager -that is responsible for coordinating water deliveries from the IDs and remittances of water fees from the village. For this reason, we are able to analyze the village, its water manager, and water use as an independent unit.
In order to meet the study's objectives, we designed three separate survey instruments -one for farmers, one for canal managers, and one for village leaders. During our survey, three types of water management institutions were identified: collective management, Water User Associations (WUAs), and contracting. In our village and canal management questionnaires we recorded the share of canals within the village that is controlled by each management type for each of three years (1990, 1995, and 2001) . In addition, enumerators also asked about how managers were compensated. When managers have rights to the earnings of the water management activities (that is, to the value of the water saved by water management reform), we say that they face strong incentives (or with incentives). If the incomes from their water management duties are not connected to water savings, they are said to be without incentives.
The survey also collected information that we use to develop several measures of the effects of water management reform -water use, production, and income. In order to get relatively accurate measures of water use, which in surface water systems is typically difficult to elicit, we adopted the strategy to interview all of those that were involved in the irrigation scheme: farmers, water managers, and village leaders. We asked about crop water use in a number of different ways: on a per irrigation basis, the number of irrigations per crop (information that was also asked of the farmers), the number of hours per irrigation, the average depth of the water, etc. With this information (and information from the household), we were able to combine the various measures into a single measure on which we develop our final estimates of water use (see appendix A).
We also systematically collected information on both income and crop production by plot and by crop for all cropping seasons during the year 2001. Income is an estimate of each household's full net income and includes all major sources of income of the household, including that from cropping, livestock, off-farm wage labor, earnings from the family's business enterprise, and other miscellaneous sources. As is standard in the household economics literature, we value all home production that is used for a household's own consumption at its market price. If the household did not buy or sell a product that it consumed itself, we use the average price from village to value the good. With information on income, we were able to construct a measure of poverty status by comparing household per capita income (dividing total household income by the number of family members, which include the household head, the household head's spouse, and all individuals that lived in the household for at least three months per year) with the national poverty line (625 yuan per capita per year in 2001).
The rest of our survey instrument asked for information about a number of other important variables that we believe affect either water management institutions or outcomes or both. For example, we asked village leaders and water managers if upper-level government officials took steps to encourage the extension of reform in their villages. A number of other questions asked about the degree of water scarcity, the level of investment in the village's irrigation system over the past 20 years, as well as a number of other village, household, and plot characteristics. Descriptive statistics of the main variables are shown in appendix B.
Reform and the evolution of water management Based on our field surveys, after upper-level officials began implementing the reforms, surface water is managed in three ways. If the village leadership through the village committee directly takes responsibility for water allocation, canal operation and maintenance (O&M), and fee collection, the village's irrigation system is said to be run by collective management, the system that essentially has allocated water in most of China's villages during the People's Republic period. A WUA is theoretically a farmer-based, participatory organization that is set up to manage the village's irrigation water. In WUAs a member-elected board is supposed to be assigned the control rights over the village's water. Contracting is a system in which the village leadership establishes a contract with an individual to manage the village's canal networks. According to our data, since the early 1990s and especially after 1995, reform has successively established WUAs and contracting in place of collective management (table 1). The share of collective management declined from 91 per cent in 1990 to 64 per cent in 2001 (column 5). Across our sample, contracting has developed more rapidly than WUAs. By 2001, 22 per cent of villages managed their water under contracting and 14 per cent through WUAs. Assuming the results from our sample reflect the more general trends across some parts of north China, the somewhat more rapid emergence of contracting may be due to the ease of setting up the system and the similarities of the reforms to the other reforms that have unfolded in rural China (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999 Based on our field survey, although some of the differences in water management among the IDs may be due to the characteristics of local villages and local water management initiatives, the dramatic differences between Ningxia and Henan Provinces suggest that upper-level government policy may be playing an important role. In 2000, in order to promote water management reform, Ningxia provincial water officials issued several documents that encouraged localities to proceed with water management reform (Wang, 2002) . Regional water officials exerted considerable effort to promote water management reform in a number of experimental areas. The sharp shift away from collective management is consistent with an interpretation that these measures were effective in pushing (or at least relaxed the constraints that were holding back) reform.
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The differences among the villages in Ningxia and variations in the way that different regions implemented the reforms (that is, some moved to contracting, while others shifted to WUAs), however, show that the reforms are far from universal. In fact, this is what would be expected in China, a nation that often allows local governments considerable room in making their own decisions on the exact form and timing of institutional changes (Jin, Qian, and Weingast, 2000) . In contrast, neither the Henan provincial government nor any of the prefectural governments have issued directives mandating reforms.
Variation in governance of various water management forms
While the shift in China's water management institutions demonstrates that the nation's communities are following policy directives that are being developed and issued from upper-level governments, when local leaders set up their organizational frameworks in their villages, practice often varies from theory. For example, at least in the early stages of the development of WUAs (the only stage of the organizations that we are observing, since this type of management is so new), the organization of most WUAs varies sharply from theory. In most cases (70 per cent of the WUAs), the governing board of the WUA was the village leadership itself. In a minority of the cases (30 per cent of the WUAs), village leaders appointed a chair or manager to carry out the day-to-day duties of the WUAs. In many of these WUAs that had village-appointed leaders, however, the manager actually had close ties to the village leadership, more than half being a leader in an earlier 6 In our field work and during the survey we spent considerable time discussing with officials about the way they pushed water management reforms. They told us that, in fact, they used a variety of ways, including issuing policy promotion documents, organizing meetings with local leaders to discuss the reforms, and talking to village leaders in more informal ways. In this way, we believe that the reforms have relaxed constraints that had kept village leaders from reforming irrigation management. We believe the main function of the action of the officials has been to send a signal to village leaders that the previous prohibitions against contracting out the village's irrigation system were being relaxed.
time period. In other words, at least in terms of the composition of the management team, most WUAs in our sample differ little from collective management. Furthermore, in reality farmers had little voice in managing or appointing the management team of their community's irrigation system. Based on our field survey data, although 80 per cent of WUAs hold regular meetings, only 30 per cent of them invite farmers to participate. Even in the villages that invited farmers to participate, on average only 5 per cent of those that attended management meetings were farmer representatives. An examination of the way that managers are compensated perhaps shows the greatest difference between theory and practice. To show this, however, we need to understand the way farmers pay fees, how managers are compensated, and how IDs are paid. 7 In fact, water management reform has created a complicated system of fees, payments, and charges that embody the primary incentives for the managers to save water. Water fees collected from farmers include two parts: basic water fees associated with the fixed quantity of land in the village and volumetric water fees associated with the volume of water used. Set by water bureau officials, the farmer is required to pay the basic water fee (which is based on his land holdings) and part of the basic water fee belongs to the water manager after it is collected. This part of the manager's compensation is paid to him as a fixed payment and provides little or no direct incentives to save water. Upper-level officials, however, can use the other part of the water fee to provide managers with more direct incentives. Prior to the farming year, ID officials determine (on the basis of historic use patterns and other criteria) a targeted amount of water that a village should use (called the target quantity). Based on a per cubic meter charge, the total value of the expected water use for the village is then divided by the village's total quantity of land and this volumetric water fee is added to the basic water fee to create the farmer's total water fee. As can be seen, the volumetric water fee also provides the farmer with no incentives to save water, since he pays a fixed fee for each hectare of land. Water managers in communities that provide their managers with incentives, in contrast, do have an incentive to save water. In implementing water management reform, ID officials agree that the water manager only has to pay the per cubic meter charge for the water that is actually used (actual quantity). If the actual quantity of water delivered to the village (at the request of the water manager) is less than the targeted quantity, the difference between the volumetric fee that is collected from the farmers and that which he pays for the water is his excess profit. In communities that give the water manager full incentive, the excess profit is an amount that is earned by the manager beyond the fixed payment.
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According to our data, there are sharp differences in the way that villages have implemented the incentive part of the reform packages, regardless of whether they are WUAs or contracting (table 2) . For example, in 2001, on average, leaders in only 41 per cent of villages offered WUA and contracting (or non-collective) managers incentives that could be expected to induce managers to exert effort to save water in order to earn an excess profit (row 1). In the rest of the villages, although there was a nominal shift in the institution type (that is leaders claimed that they were implementing WUAs or contracting), in fact, from an incentive point of view, the WUA and contracting managers faced no incentives (row 1). In these villages, water managers are like village leaders in a collectively managed system, in that they do not have any financial incentive to save water. The incentives offered the managers differ across IDs (rows 2 to 6). Hence, to the extent that the incentives are the most important parts of the reform, the differences across time and space mean that it would not be surprising if in some villages WUAs and contracting were more effective at saving water than in others.
Somewhat ironically, since one of the main goals of water management reform is to provide farmers with better irrigation services, the design of the water management reforms placed little emphasis on the incentives for farmers. In many villages, at most the water management reforms mandated that water fees paid by farmers should be reduced. However, the reduction in the water fees in most villages was quite modest. On average, water fees were reduced by only about 9 per cent.
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Water management and crop water use In the search for water savings, although it is possible that water managers may use certain methods of water management that would save water at the expense of farmers, in fact most managers (perhaps under the scrutiny of village leaders and ID officials) attempted to develop new ways of managing water that increased water use efficiency without having a systematic negative effect on production or incomes. In particular, based on our field survey, irrigation managers took actions to save water in a number of ways. They both improved the operation of the system (by supervising water delivery more intensively and using new techniques) and increased canal maintenance. For example, in the study regions, rice is one of main crops. In local irrigation systems using traditional leaderrun management regimes, leaders often used a practice, in which there was continuous flooding of the fields over long periods of time during the season. Obviously, such a system is less supervision intensive, as the only time the official needs to spend on management is the few minutes that it takes to open a few gates in the canal network, when there is water in the main canals from the irrigation district. They can then forget about their management duties. In such a system, a lot of water flows through the village's canal system and directly into the outflow ditches.
However, in some reformed regions (in many cases under the direction of local extension agents), local canal managers adopted a system of irrigation called 'alternate wetting and drying irrigation.' According to this technology practice, after the irrigation canals are used to flood the fields, they are closed for a period of time, right up to the time that the soil begins to dry out. At this point, the fields are then flooded again. Of course, it takes a lot more supervision time to do this properly, as the water deliveries are on and off, and need more precise timing. According to a joint study by the International Water Management Institute, International Rice Research Institute, and Wuhan University's Hydrology Department, alternate wetting and drying irrigation can save up to 30 per cent of the delivery of water to the fields, without affecting yields (Barker et al., 2001) . In some of the experiments, yields rose. Data source: Authors' survey.
Our surveys also identified a number of other ways that managers saved water. Villages used 'water rotation' irrigation (instead of flooding the entire village through a single outlet); 'timed released' irrigation (a system that more carefully times the opening and closing of irrigation inlets and outlets); and improved canal maintenance (implemented by lateral de-silting and keeping the canal network inside the village free of debris and plant matter). Therefore, in our paper, the water savings appear to be due, at least in part, to the management-induced efficiency improvements.
Although the major objective of water management reform is to save water, descriptive statistics using our data show that water use in some areas that have established WUAs and contracting is lower than those areas still under collective management, and higher in others (table 3) . For example, in the second ID in Ningxia (ID-2), the water use per hectare in areas that have reformed (WUAs and contracting) is lower than those areas in which the collective still manages the water (rows 5 and 6 versus row 4). However, in Ningxia's other ID (ID-1) and in Henan, water use per hectare is higher in those villages that have shifted to WUAs or contracting (rows 1-3, 7 and 8).
While the effectiveness of changing from collective to non-collective management in terms of water saving is not clear, descriptive statistics from our data show the importance of policy implemention. In particular, the potential importance of incentives in making the reforms work is shown when comparing water use in those villages that provide their water managers with incentives with those that do not (table 4) . After reform, when managers face incentives to earn profits by saving water, water use per hectare is lower by nearly 10 per cent when compared with collectively managed systems across our Ningxia sample (row 1, columns 1 and 3). In contrast, when leaders implement water management reform without providing incentives, water use is higher (column 2). When examining the individual IDs in Ningxia, we also find that in both IDs water use is lower (or perhaps it does not rise as much) when incentives are provided during reform than when they are not. In ID-2, for example, water use is lower in both non-collective systems with and without incentives, but it is even lower for those with incentives (row 3). In ID-1, although water use in both non-collective systems is higher, it is less high for those with incentives (row 2). We also find the same patterns occur when examining individual crops (rows 4 to 6). While our descriptive analysis shows that there is a positive correlation between incentives and water savings, in fact there can be many other factors that are correlated with incentives, creating the tendency for incentives and water savings to move together. In particular, it can be seen that the cropping structure, the nature of the canal system's investment, and the scarcity of water may affect the managerial type, the way reforms are implemented, and water use. As a result, multivariate analysis is required to analyze the relationship between water management reform, incentives, water use, and other outcomes.
Multivariate empirical model and results
Based on the above discussion, the link between water use per hectare and its determinants can be represented by the following equation
where w jk represents average water use per hectare for household j in village k. 11 The rest of the variables are those that explain water use: M k , our variable of interest, measures either the type of the water management institution or the nature of the incentives faced by the water manager; Z jk , a matrix of control variables, represents other village and household factors that affect water use. Specifically, we include a number of variables to hold constant the nature of the village's production environment and its cropping structure. We include variables measuring the source of water (either surface or ground), the degree of water scarcity, and the level of irrigation investment per hectare (a stock variable estimated as the sum of the investments made over the past 20 years). 12 Cropping structure is measured as the proportion of the village's sown area that is in rice. Household characteristics include age and education of the household head and the household's land endowment. Finally, our model also includes D jk , a dummy variable representing the ID that serves the household. The symbols α, β, and γ are parameters to be estimated and ε jk is the error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables in our initial equations, an assumption that we subsequently relax.
The results of our empirical estimation for our water use model are reported in table 5. The goodness of fit measure, the adjusted R 2 , around 0.45, is relatively high for analyses that use cross-sectional household data. Many coefficients on our control variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant. For example, we find that after holding constant other factors, households that are in villages with more rice area use more water per hectare than other crops. We also find that those villages that face more severe water shortages use less water per hectare. 13 by household; (d) total water use for each farmer is created by multiplying the village average water use per hectare per irrigation times the number of irrigations per crop. Because by construction (and in fact) there is correlation among the observations on water use within a village, our results are corrected for clustering at the village level. 12 The degree of water scarcity is an indicator variable developed from a question included in the village questionnaire. Enumerators asked village leaders to characterize the nature of water resources in their village. The leaders chose one of three precoded answers: 1 = water is very scarce; 2 = water is relatively scarce and frequently constrains agricultural production; and 3 = water is not short (at least currently). The indicator variable takes on the value of one if the leader responded either 1 or 2; and zero if he responded 3. 13 Unlike some of the control variables, it should be noted that there is a lack of statistical significance of the variables measuring the household characteristics of the manager. One explanation may be that this is due to the way we have measured our water use variable -it varies more across villages than among households within a village. While this may be true, there are two reasons we should not be concerned about this. First, although the household characteristics are insignificant, we really need not be concerned since these are only control variables and are not our variables of interest. Second, to assuage concerns that the inclusion or exclusion of the household variables do not matter, we ran a separate set of regressions that are identical to those in table 5 in which we have dropped the household variables. There is virtually no change to our variable of interest. The magnitudes of the variables are about the same (they differ by about 15 per cent). The t-ratios are also about the same, higher in the OLS equation (2.51 instead of 1.77) and only a bit lower for the 2SLS estimator (1.85 instead of 1.99). After holding constant other factors, our results show that the mere fact of shifting management from the collective to either a WUA system or contracting by itself does not lead to water savings (table 5, column 1). The signs on the coefficients of the WUA and contracting variables are negative, suggesting that water use is lower in villages that have moved to non-collective management (rows 1 and 2). However, the standard errors are all large relative to the magnitude of the coefficients, which implies that nominal institutional reform has no significant impact on saving water.
When officials provide water managers with incentives, without regard to whether they shifted to WUA or contract management, managers reduce water deliveries in the village (table 5, column 2). Econometric results show that the coefficient on the incentive indicator variable is negative and significant (at the 10 per cent level), when compared with the collective management, the omitted institutional type (row 3). In other words, without regard to the form of the water management institution, if managers face positive incentives, water use per hectare can be reduced by nearly 3,000 cubic meters, about 20 per cent of their typical water use.
Although interesting, it is possible that the estimated parameter is biased, since water use per hectare and water management may be determined simultaneously with water use, or that the estimated coefficient is affected by unobserved heterogeneity. For example, it is possible that in areas that are facing rising demand for water from cities, farmers naturally reduce water use in anticipation of future water restrictions. At the same time, village leaders in the areas may be trying to forestall the shortages by adopting new institutional arrangements to show that they are concerned about the pending water crisis. In such a situation, the coefficient on the water management institution (or incentive) variable could be negative, even if the institution itself has no effect.
In order to control for the potential endogeneity of water management types and incentives in the water use equation, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach. To do so, prior to estimating equation (1), we can regress a set of variables on the water management institution variable, M k
where the predicted value of M k from equation (2),M k , would replace M k in equation (1). Equation (2) includes Z k , which are measures of the other village-level control variables (which are the same as those in equation (1) e.g., measures of the village's production environment and cropping structure). This IV procedure, however, is only valid if the variables in the IV matrix in equation (2) meet the definition of instruments. The key IV in equation (2) that we use to address the endogeneity problem is a variable (I V k ) that measures the effect of the decision of regional policy makers to push water management reform in village k. Such a measure should function well as an instrument, especially in our setting, since the officials that were responsible for promoting water management reform believed that, at least in the short run, they were choosing villages on a fairly random basis. An official in one ID told us that intially he went to villages in which he personally knew the local officials. If the spectrum of the aquaintances of the typical water system officials are independent of the amount of water used in the village, our policy variable should meet the criteria of an instrumental variable: it is correlated with the decision of a village to participate in water management reform, but does not have an effect on water use (or income or crop production), except through the influence of the reform. We also include the age and education of the village leader as IVs. 14 We report the results of equation (2) run by itself in appendix C. The adjusted R-square statistics range from 0.23 to 0.94. Importantly, the results show that the water policy intervention variable, P k , is positive and statistically significant; the variable meets the first criteria of an IV. Although the coefficients on the variables measuring village leader characteristics are insignificant, the Hausman test of the exclusion restrictions that are designed to test the validity of the instruments show that our instruments are statistically valid and meet the second criteria of IVs.
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When putting the predicted value of the water management variable into the water use model in equation (1), our results change little and largely support the findings from the OLS model (table 5, columns 3 and 4). Compared with OLS estimation, the t-ratio of the estimated coefficient on the incentive variable actually rises (row 3). The magnitude of the coefficient also suggests that the savings from providing incentives are large. Holding other variables constant, in the villages in which leaders offer managers positive incentives, water use declines more than 6,000 cubic meters per hectare, about 40 per cent of average water use (row 3, column 4).
Water management, production, income and poverty According to our results, water management reform, at least when implemented as designed, leads to water savings and meets the primary goal of water sector officials. However, it is possible that the success from such a policy only comes at a cost, either in terms of falling production or income or increased poverty. In this section, we examine how water management reform affects agricultural production. We then examine its impact on income and the incidence of poverty.
Descriptive statistics from our data show that water management reform negatively influences agricultural production (table 6, rows 1-3). Compared 14 We include village leader characteristics as IVs, following Li (1999) . In the work of Li, the author claims that village leader characteristics may affect reform in the village, but the leader's characteristics would not have an independent effect on production decisions (in our case, water use). 15 To test if the set of identifying instruments are exogenous, a Lagrange multiplier test can be used (Hausman). The chi-square-distributed test statistic with four degree of freedom, is N*R 2 , where N is the number of observations, and R 2 is the measure of goodness-of-fit of the regression of the residues from the water use equation (1) on the variables that are exogenous to the system. The test statistics are 0.76 for WUAs, 2.92 for contracting, 1.68 for non-collective with incentives, and 5.51 for non-collective without incentives. The test results indicate that the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the exogenous instruments and the disturbance term from water use and equation (1) cannot be rejected. with villages that continue to operate irrigation by collective management, in the villages that provide incentives to managers to save water, wheat yields decline by nearly 10 per cent. Maize and rice yields also decline by 9 and 12 per cent respectively. The negative effect of incentives on production is even clearer when comparing the yields between villages that nominally implement reforms but do not provide incentives to water managers with those that do provide incentives (rows 1 to 3, column 1 versus 2). In the case of wheat and maize yields, while production in villages with managers that have positive incentives falls, in villages that have moved to WUAs and contracting, but have not provided incentives, production actually rises marginally. In the case of rice, yields fall for villages that only reform nominally, but not for villages that provide incentives to their managers. Since the pattern in production is consistent with, though in the opposite direction of, the correlations between water management and water use, the descriptive data suggest that water savings through management reform may only be able to come at a cost of lower yields.
In contrast, the negative influence of water management reform on production does not appear in the descriptive statistics when examining farmer income (table 6). Evidence from our survey reveals that, in the villages where leaders reformed their water management system and provided incentives to managers, farmers actually have higher incomes (row 4). Surprisingly, crop income also is higher in villages that have provided managers with incentives (row 5). Part of the explanation for the difference between yields and income may be due to the fact that water fees also fall in villages that have reformed. It also may be that farmers are shifting their production decisions and allocating labor to other enterprises in villages that provide water managers with incentives. Econometric analysis is needed to isolate the effect of reform on cropping income. Econometric analysis also appears to be needed to distinguish between water management reform and poverty effects; in contrast to the case of income, our descriptive data show that poverty is worse in those villages that provide managers with incentives (row 6).
Multivariate empirical model and results
In addition to water management reform, other socio-economic factors also influence agricultural production, income, and poverty. In order to answer the question of whether water management reform affects outcomes, it is necessary to control for these other factors. To do so, we specify the link between agricultural production and its determinants as
where Q i jk represents the yields of wheat, maize, or rice from the ith plot of household j in village k (which comes from our household survey). In equation (3), yields are explained by the variable of interest, W i jk , which measures water use per hectare, X i jk , which measures other inputs to the production process, Z i jk , which holds other factors constant, including characteristics of the production environment of the village, household, and plot, and the irrigation district dummy, D k . Agricultural production inputs include measures of per hectare use of labor (measured in man days), fertilizer (measured in aggregated physical units), 16 and expenditures on other inputs, such as fees paid for custom services. The control variables for village and household characteristics are the same as for equation (1), except that we do not use the village-level cropping structure. We also add five plot characteristics: two soil type variables; plot location (distance from the plot to the farmer's house); whether the crop on the plot is planted in rotation with another crop or not (single crop equals one, zero otherwise); and production shocks (measured as farmer-estimated yield reduction in percentage terms on a plot, due to a flood, drought, or other 'disaster').
The impact of water management reform is measured through the water use variable. If production responds positively to water use, then we can deduce that water management reform will have an effect in the opposite direction, because of the water-reducing effect that we found in table 5. However, because table 5 combined all crops together at the household level, and in our production analysis we examine wheat, maize, and rice separately at the plot level, we need to have separate measures of the effect of water management reform on water use by crop. The results of these alternative water use equations are included in appendix D and show that, in the case of all crops, the coefficient on the variable measuring the presence of incentives in local water management institutions is negative (and is significantly so for wheat and rice). 17 Predictions from appendix D are used in the 2SLS estimates of equation (3).
We also establish the following equation to examine the relationship between income and other factors
where y jk represents either total or cropping income per capita for household j, and the other variables, including M jk , our interested variable (a measure of incentives), are the same as in equation (1). We also added a measure of the number of children per household. In examining the effect of water management reform on poverty, we proceed in largely the same way. Because we are measuring poverty in terms of income, we use the same specification as in equation (4) and expect similar results, albeit with opposite signs. We report the model analyzing the effects of water management reform on production, income, and poverty in tables 7 to 9 and note that the results are robust. The goodness-of-fit measure for production and income models ranges from 0.16 to 0.40. A number of the coefficients of our control variables were of expected sign and statistically significant. For example, the production shock variable shows that droughts and floods not only negatively influence agricultural production, but also reduce farmer income and adversely affect the household's poverty status. Households with larger farm size also positively affect incomes.
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Our results show that reforming water management reduces wheat yield, but has no significant impact on the yields of maize and rice. From the wheat water use model, when villages provide water managers with incentives, managers reduce water use per hectare by about 3,800 cubic meters, a decline of about 50 per cent (appendix D, column 1, row 1). At the same time, the coefficient on the predicted water use variable in the wheat yield equation is positive and statistically significant (table 7, column 1, row 1). The estimated water use elasticity for wheat yield is 0.226. Overall, our estimates of the size of the decline in water use and the responsiveness of wheat yields to water use imply that water management reform reduces wheat yields by about 11 per cent. In contrast, although we find that incentives have a negative association with water use, the estimated water 17 The analysis uses plot-level data for the estimations in appendix D. We also use predicted values of water management reform for the estimations in appendix D, because of our concerns of endogeneity. 18 Although the coefficients on the fertilizer variable in the maize and rice yield equations are positive, significant, and similar to results found elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Putterman and Chiacu, 1994) , as found in much of the literature on cross-section production analysis at the household level, our other coefficients are insignificant due to measurement problems (e.g., we observe labor days, not effort), multicollinearity (e.g., when farmers use high levels of one input, they often use high levels of all other inputs), and endogeneity (management ability and weather shocks are not measured completely). b Productive assets include assets used for agricultural and non-agricultural production activities. * Significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%. If our plot level analysis of water management and production is correct, then this would mean that, in our sample areas, the main tradeoff between the water savings from management reform and production occurs for wheat and the tradeoff is less severe or absent for maize and rice. The conclusion is plausible and, although its validity may only be true for our sample region, it is consistent with many of the observations we made in the field. Wheat is the crop that depends more than any other on irrigation, because its growth period occurs almost entirely during the dry season. Water cutbacks should be expected to reduce yields. Maize, in contrast, is grown during the wet season and water managers that have an incentive to save water may be able to time their use of irrigation water with the rains, while those that have no interest in saving water might adhere to a predetermined water delivery schedule, no matter what the weather. In the case of rice, although the crop is dependent on large volumes of irrigation water, experiments by domestic and international water scientists have shown that there are many new ways of managing rice irrigation (e.g., alternative wetting and drying -see Barker, Loeve, and Tuong, 2001 ) that can lead to water savings, but that do not have significant yield effects in many cases. New water management technologies, however, require effort to learn and implement. Our results, then, may demonstrate that it is managers with incentives that have been able and willing to use these new technologies that have brought water savings without large yield declines.
Our research results also demonstrate that water management reform has no statistically significant impact on farmer incomes (tables 8 and 9). When we use either an OLS or 2SLS approach, the coefficients on the incentive variables in both the total and cropping income models are not statistically significant. Consistent with the descriptive statistics (which find no obvious fall in income in those villages that give water managers incentives), our results may suggest that, whatever negative income effect there is from falling wheat production, it is being offset partially by reductions in water fees (though, as seen above, the reductions in water prices were fairly small). It could also be that the average reduction in income due to lower wheat yields is small enough, only 89 yuan (11 per cent of average wheat yield, 4,740 kg per hectare, times average wheat sown area per household, 0.17 hectare, times the price of wheat, 1 yuan per kg), that it cannot be detected statistically. Moreover, since the fall in household income is less than 1.2 per cent, the losses in cropping are likely to be offset by other actions taken by households (e.g., because water management is better, it is possible that farmers can focus more on other economic activities).
Similar results can also be found in the poverty model. Since we measure poverty status as 'under the poverty line or not', our results say that there is no effect on household poverty status of a village's decision to provide water managers with incentives. If universally true, such a finding would be important, since critics of water management reform often point out that one possible adverse consequence of using incentives to induce water savings is that managers may cut back on water deliveries to marginal users, who may also be those on the poorest land with the lowest incomes. Our results here, however, should be interpreted with caution. First, we have not identified what may be behind this result. In many villages, leaders have specified strict rules in their agreements with water managers that they cannot exclude households from water allocation schedules. Second, as seen by examining the estimations in table 9, only a few of the coefficients are significant, a sign that our sample may be too small to identify poverty effects. In short, while interesting, we believe our current results may be more important as a tool that raises awareness of possible associations, rather than providing definitive answers. Future research should try to pinpoint the source of this effect and use larger data sets to strengthen our understanding of these issues.
Conclusion
In this paper we have sought to understand the reform of China's surface water management systems and their effects on water use, output, income, and poverty. Research results show that, since 1990, collective water management has been replaced by WUAs and contracting in many locations. In some regions, the reform institutions have become the dominant form of management. Spread mostly by the efforts of water officials, we have shown that implementation has often deviated from theory. Participation by farmers has played only a minor role in most villages. In some villages, reform has been only nominally implemented, and there are few apparent differences when comparing the 'reform' institutions to traditional management forms. In part because of these implementation problems, our analysis has shown that nominal reform has had little effect on water use.
The absence of a systematic relationship between nominal reform and water use, however, does not mean that the entire reform process has failed. Indeed, one of the main features of China's water management reforms, the provision of incentives to water managers, appears to have succeeded in achieving large water savings, while having only a small or no effect on agricultural production or rural incomes. Our findings demonstrate that, in villages that provided water managers with strong incentives, water use fell sharply. The incentives also must have improved the efficiency of the irrigation systems, since the output of major crops, such as rice and maize, did not fall, and rural incomes and poverty remained statistically unchanged. Only wheat production fell. Although our study needs to be undertaken in other areas in the future before the results can be generalized to the rest of China, at least in the sample sites that provided their manager incentives, water management reform has been nearly a win-win policy. We note that we can find little if any effect of participation by farmers on water use in our sample sites.
Overall, we believe that our findings support the conclusion that the government should continue to support water management reform. Officials that want the reforms to succeed should make an effort to ensure that more emphasis be put on effective implementation. Although negative impacts on production and farmer income were not found, in the longer run, as water management reform reaches into more water scarce areas and seeks to continue to achieve water savings in areas that have already cut back on use, there may be sharper tradeoffs between water use and production and income. When the tradeoffs are larger, officials may still choose to opt for pushing reforms that save water. In these cases, since the farmers that lose access to water could also suffer production and income falls, policies to mitigate the adverse consequences should be developed.
It should be noted that it is not automatic that field-level delivery savings (the type of savings that we are talking about here) lead to true basin-wide savings. It is possible that water lost during the delivery and on the field could help recharge underground aquifers. However, since there is so little groundwater used in our IDs, this is not really an issue. It is also possible that, if all of the water that was used on the fields prior to reform went into the groundwater and flowed back into the river, there would be really no true savings. While the share of groundwater that is 'wasted' during delivery to the field in some parts of the Yellow River system may flow back into the river, in other parts (e.g., in Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, and Henan) there are sinks and areas in which the river bed is above the area being irrigated. In China's dry, hot, and windy areas along most parts of the Yellow River, over irrigation could lead to significant amounts of evaporation. Hence, although we do not know for sure (and cannot find any hydrologists that know for certain), it seems that in this case, reducing field deliveries could also lead to true water savings. This may not be true in all situations, however. Because measuring water use in villages that use surface water is always a difficult task, during the enumeration process we developed a methodology that was based on a strategy of eliciting information from more than one respondant in each community and asking about water use in a number of ways. To implement this strategy, we included special blocks on water use in both the village and canal manager forms. We also asked ID officials in each area for information that could be used to check our survey-based estimates. We not only asked the respondants to provide estimates of water use per hectare on a cubic meter basis, but also recorded other information about the application process, such as the length of time that it took to apply water in the village, the depth to which the average field was flooded, the type of the soil, and the area irrigated. We elicited these data for each irrigation for each crop during the season.
The data that we collected in the different survey forms were used to create a household-level (and plot-level) measure of average water use per hectare for each crop for each village. The first step involved comparing the direct estimates of water use per hectare from village leaders and canal managers by crop and by irrigation at the village level. If both of these respondants provided estimates, and neither estimate exceeded or fell below the feasibility range that was estimated by the local ID officials, we averaged the two estimates. According to our survey, nearly 80 per cent of village leaders and canal managers were able to provide relatively accurate estimates of this number. If one or both of the respondants were unable to provide a direct estimate of water use, we then used the other information about the village's irrigation system (e.g., length of time that it took to apply water in the village, the depth to which the average field was flooded, the type of the soil and area irrigated) to predict water use. We used these predictions in the same way as the raw data and compared them with the estimates of the other respondant and boundaries set by the local ID officials. At this point of the analysis, each village had a set of parameters that measured the average amount of water used per hectare per irrigation for each crop. Combining these parameters with plot-level data (which provided information on the number of irrigations used on each crop by each household), we were able to aggregate across crops (weighted by their area shares) and produce a household-level measure of water use per hectare. 
